How Oore trusts Direct macOS runners
Understand repository trust, runner placement, claim eligibility, and the limits of direct execution.
A Direct macOS runner executes repositories that an owner or admin has chosen to trust. It is a compatibility-first build executor, not a sandbox for hostile repository code.
Source linking is the trust decision
Creating a project or changing its linked source authorizes that repository’s checkout, dependencies, and commands to run with the Direct runner account’s permissions. Oore does not ask for a second per-repository execution approval.
Verified GitHub and GitLab events can create work only for an immutable revision that belongs to the linked repository. External-fork and ambiguous revisions are ignored rather than executed automatically.
The runner is a separate process
Complete profile setup enrolls a managed Direct macOS runner on the control-plane Mac. An operator can add a Runner profile on another Mac. In both placements:
ooredremains the control-plane authority- the runner token identifies the runner
- protocol compatibility and job assignment are checked before work is returned
- repository commands run with the runner’s macOS account permissions
The control plane returns the registration token once, and the CLI stores it in the runner configuration without displaying it. Protect that configuration. Embedded and hybrid execution are unavailable.
Eligibility is not another trust grant
Before a runner claims queued work, the control plane checks that the instance is accepting new builds and the linked source remains available. The Allow approved repositories control under Settings > Runners pauses or resumes new claims.
Turning it off lets active work drain and leaves queued work waiting. It does not cancel active jobs, revoke a project’s repository trust, or introduce a second approval list.
Each job stays bound to its source
A claimed job carries the repository identity, pinned revision, selected pipeline information, and a scoped signing capability. The runner retrieves signing material through assignment-bound paths rather than placing those values in repository configuration.
If an operator relinks the project, queued work for the previous repository is canceled. Already-active work keeps its build-bound identity instead of silently switching repositories.
Defense-in-depth has a limit
Oore uses private workspaces, a job-bound checkout proxy for GitLab, managed-environment scrubbing, runner-owned signing, output verification, and cleanup to reduce accidental leakage. Those controls do not isolate malicious code already trusted to run under the same macOS account.
A dedicated non-admin runner account reduces the host authority available to a build. Strong isolation for untrusted contributions requires disposable macOS virtual machines and is outside the supported V1 runner model.
What this means for you
- Link only repositories that you trust under the Runner account.
- Treat source relinking as a new execution trust decision.
- Protect the runner token and the network path to a runner on another Mac.
- Use the operational pause to drain work, not as a repository approval mechanism.
- Do not rely on Direct mode to contain hostile dependencies or build scripts.
Next step
Operate a Direct macOS runner. Use the generated Runners API reference for exact runner operations and payloads.